It features an article by Dolf Rami, entitled, “Notions of Existence in Frege.” Here is the abstract:
Irad kimhi philosophy full#
Or rather: that they are the same and different.Volume 9.8 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access: In the end the monist will say neither that they are two, nor one. The difference between OPNC and PPNC will then correspond to the difference between the consciousness expressed by “ p” and the self-consciousness expressed by “I think p.” But this talk of “difference” does not mean that PPNC and OPNC are two different principles. Understanding OPNC consists in seeing that the repetition of p in these logical contexts is self-cancelling. This means that ~( p and ~ p) and ( p and ~ p) are not genuine propositions. As such, from this point of view we come to see that no conscious act is displayed or specified by the proposition of the form ( p and ~ p) and therefore no judgment or assertion is displayed by ~( p and ~ p). Hence, for example, understanding p as an expression of consciousness depends on understanding the use of p in negation. From the monist point of view, a simple propositional sign displays a possible act of consciousness, but the identity of this act depends on the uses of a proposition within other propositional contexts. That is, we shall come to see that this self-consciousness is essentially the expression of consciousness by language.
Since a unity in consciousness is the same as a consciousness of unity, the monist holds that a belief or a judgment is as such self-conscious, and we shall come to see that such self-consciousness is essentially contained in the use of language. Psycho / logical monism takes a belief or judgment to be a unity that is immanent and thus only identifiable within a larger unity-that of consciousness and language. Ultimately, Kimhi's work elucidates the essential sameness of thinking and being that has exercised Western philosophy since its inception. Self-consciousness, language, and logic are revealed to be but different sides of the same reality. In closing the gap that Frege opened, Kimhi shows that the two principles of non-contradiction-the ontological principle and the psychological principle-are in fact aspects of the very same capacity, differently manifested in thinking and being.As his argument progresses, Kimhi draws on the insights of historical figures such as Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein to develop highly original accounts of topics that are of central importance to logic and philosophy more generally. Yet by thus sundering the logical from the psychological, Frege was unable to explain certain fundamental logical truths, most notably the psychological version of the law of non-contradiction-that one cannot think a thought and its negation simultaneously.Irad Kimhi's Thinking and Being marks a radical break with Frege's legacy in analytic philosophy, exposing the flaws of his approach and outlining a novel conception of judgment as a two-way capacity. Logic does not describe how we actually think, but only how we should. Opposing a long-standing orthodoxy of the Western philosophical tradition running from ancient Greek thought until the late nineteenth century, Frege argued that psychological laws of thought-those that explicate how we in fact think-must be distinguished from logical laws of thought-those that formulate and impose rational requirements on thinking.
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